Optimizing Regulation for an Optimizing Economy by Coglianese, Cary
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2018 
Optimizing Regulation for an Optimizing Economy 
Cary Coglianese 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Law and Economics 
Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Public Administration Commons, Public 
Policy Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons 
Repository Citation 
Coglianese, Cary, "Optimizing Regulation for an Optimizing Economy" (2018). Faculty Scholarship at Penn 
Law. 2116. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2116 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
  
 
UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA 
JOURNAL of LAW & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 		
Vol. 4 Nov. 2018 No. 1 
 
 
OPTIMIZING REGULATION FOR AN  
OPTIMIZING ECONOMY  
 
Cary Coglianese* 
 
 
Much economic activity in the United States today emanates from technological 
advances that optimize through contextualization. Innovations as varied as 
Airbnb and Uber, fintech firms, and precision medicine are transforming major 
sectors in the economy by customizing goods and services as well as refining 
matches between available resources and interested buyers. The technological 
advances that make up the optimizing economy create new challenges for 
government oversight of the economy. Traditionally, government has overseen 
economic activity through general regulations that aim to treat all individuals 
equally; however, in the optimizing economy, business is moving in the direction 
of greater individualization, not generalization. An ever more optimizing 
economy therefore demands an increasingly smart, optimizing system of 
regulatory oversight. To ensure that government can properly balance policy 
goals in the new economy, steps need to be taken now to enhance the 
technological and analytical sophistication of the regulatory workforce, improve 
government’s information technology infrastructure, build stronger and more 
complete collections of data, and draw on policy lessons from other periods of 
technological innovations. In the optimizing economy, government regulators 
will continue to play a crucial role in protecting the public from market failures, 
but, to fulfill that role, government will need to follow the private sector’s lead 
and build up its own capacity for optimization.  
																																								 																				
*Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Political Science; Director, Penn Program on 
Regulation, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Across a range of sectors, economic activity in the United States today 
increasingly derives from technological advances that facilitate the use of 
resources in ever more marginally effective and efficient ways. Rather than 
exploiting new resources altogether, many of the most captivating 
innovations in today’s economy instead deploy technology to optimize the 
production or allocation of existing resources, goods, and services. 
Consider several seemingly disparate examples. So-called sharing-
economy firms like Uber and Airbnb find transformational ways to allocate 
to willing buyers otherwise under-used resources, such as private cars and 
extra bedrooms. Marketing firms rely more than ever on data mining to make 
highly targeted pitches to consumers, while supply-chain and delivery system 
optimization has streamlined manufacturing and retail markets. Major 
advances in health care now travel under the banner of “precision medicine,” 
with health care professionals using sophisticated genetic screening and other 
data analysis to target treatments even more effectively to individual patients. 
Fintech firms promise to deliver financial products more accurately designed 
and priced to reflect underlying borrower risks and thus expand access to 
capital. These and other changes across the economy signal an important 
trend toward using technology to contextualize in ways that make possible 
more efficient uses of available resources.1 
The emergence of such an optimizing economy holds important 
implications for public policy. Government must be able to keep up with 
fast-changing technological developments in order both to fulfill its 
important responsibilities to protect the public and to keep from impeding 
socially valuable changes in the economy. Just as the end of horse-and-
buggy days meant that local governments needed to purchase cars for police 
officers to enforce speed limits on the roads, so too must regulatory agencies 
of all kinds adapt and respond to an increasingly technologically advanced 
society. An ever optimizing economy depends on an equally ever 
optimizing regulatory system. Government will not only fail to fulfill its 
important responsibilities if it cannot keep pace with private-sector 
innovation, but lagging governmental capacity also risks contributing to 
counterproductive barriers in private innovation, through blunt, ineffectual 
regulation. Policymakers from both ends of the political spectrum should 
be able to unite behind efforts to optimize regulation, taking steps to 
strengthen governmental capacity and improve its efficiency to match better 
the most significant trends toward optimization in the private sector and to 
ensure sustainable economic growth. 
																																								 																				
1 For further discussion of these trends, see infra Part I. 
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I. THE OPTIMIZING ECONOMY 
 
 Economic growth depends on finding optimal outcomes for society. In 
this general sense, the idea of optimization is hardly new. The American economy 
has long benefited from entrepreneurial efforts to optimize business activity, such 
as when assembly-line methods dramatically improved manufacturing efficiency 
around the turn of the last century.2 What is different today is how technology 
increasingly achieves optimization by enhanced precision in matching goods and 
services to individual preferences and needs. Today’s optimization is often 
marked by a leap forward in individualization, as well as on a reliance on big data 
and advanced analytics to support greater contextualization and distributed 
activity. Major innovations with these characteristics are already starting to 
disrupt major sectors of the economy, including transportation, energy, health 
care, and manufacturing. More looms on the horizon.3 
The transportation service behemoth, Uber, may provide the most 
salient example of the kind of disruption that the new optimizing model can 
create. Uber and, to a lesser extent, Lyft are transforming transportation 
services throughout the nation’s metropolitan areas by giving everyone with 
a smartphone the ability to find a driver willing to take them where they want 
to go. These companies are built on digital and networking technology that 
improves the allocation of existing resources by matching people who need 
transportation with people who have vehicles and time available. 
In this same way, other so-called sharing-economy firms also make better 
use of resources that would otherwise go under-utilized. Airbnb, for example, 
matches homes and apartments that property owners have available with  
people who want a place to stay. In New York City alone, 416,000 guests took 
advantage of Airbnb from August 2012 to July 2013, which, by one estimate, 
translated into a drop in rental of one million hotel rooms during that period.4 
																																								 																				
2 ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF 
LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 557 (2016) (noting how “[t]he assembly line, together with 
electric-powered tools, utterly transformed manufacturing” in the early 1900s). 
3 Many of these economic changes bear affinities with what Jeremy Rifkin describes as the “zero 
marginal cost society.” JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET 
OF THINGS, THE COLLABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM (2015). 
4 Laura Kusisto, Airbnb Cites its Role in City, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/airbnb-cites-its-role-in-city-1382405272 (citing a recent survey that found that Airbnb cost 
the New York hotel industry one million dollars in lost room nights over a period of eleven 
months); Jeremy Rifkin, The Rise of the Sharing Economy, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2014/apr/06/opinion/la-oe-rifkin-airbnb-20140406 [https://perma.cc/68MM 
-G5DP] (citing the same survey). A study of Airbnb’s impact on the hotel sector in Texas found 
that the entrance of Airbnb into this market reduced hotel prices, as well as contributed to up 
to a 10 percent decline in revenue for incumbent hotels. Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the 
Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 1, 16 (Boston Univ. 
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The optimizing economy is broader than just sharing-economy firms. 
Conventional retail business also has been shaped dramatically by optimization. 
eBay optimizes retail sales by matching people who have items to sell with 
customers who want them. Amazon and Netflix use machine-learning to match 
customers better with products they likely desire. When customers go online to 
shop today, they now see displayed a variety of products identified as likely to 
interest them in particular. Facebook and other social media firms provide data 
to support still more sophisticated micro-targeted retail marketing.5 
Similar strategies that optimize through individualization are starting 
to transform medicine.6 Lung cancer treatments, for example, can now be 
customized based upon the identification of specific individual genes.7 This 
movement toward so-called precision medicine is also facilitated by 
sophisticated data analysis of health records—somewhat akin to what 
Amazon and Netflix do with consumer purchasing data. The national shift to 
electronic medical records will only enhance future health care delivery based 
on machine learning and more precisely targeted treatments.8  
Retailers like Amazon not only optimize through more individualized 
marketing, but they also have significantly optimized their supply chain 
management, inventory control, and product delivery systems. Overall,  
e-commerce businesses optimize retail space, as webpages take the place of 
physical stores and showrooms. But even with its warehouse storage, Amazon has 
																																								 																				
Sch. Of Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2013-16, Nov. 18, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898.  
5 See, e.g., TOM AGAN, SILENT MARKETING: MICRO-TARGETING 3 (Penn, Schoen & Berland 
Assoc.’s eds., 2007), http://gaia.adage.com/images/random/microtarget031207.pdf (“[Micro-
targeting] combines attitudes, available consumer data and demographics to find like-minded 
people . . . and predict what they will do”); Bernard Marr, Big Data: A Game Changer in the 
Retail Sector, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2015/11/10/ 
big-data-a-game-changer-in-the-retail-sector/#6bb069a59f37 [https://perma.cc/T2VB-YFME] 
(stating that big data analytic tools are being used to predict retail trends, optimize pricing, 
determine where demand will be, and identify interested buyers). Retail political campaigning 
has also been transformed by predictive analytics, big data, and microtargeting. See BRUCE I. 
NEWMAN, THE MARKETING REVOLUTION IN POLITICS: WHAT RECENT U.S. PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGNS CAN TEACH US ABOUT EFFECTIVE MARKETING 38 (2016) (explaining how 
campaign strategists have used micro-targeting to “break down the marketplace of voters into 
segments that were likely to be influenced by particular advertising strategies”). 
6 See generally J. Larry Jameson & Dan L. Longo, Precision Medicine—Personalized, 
Problematic, and Promising, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2229 (2015); see also Francis S. Collins & 
Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 793 (2015) 
(discussing the benefits of precision medicine’s individualized, molecular approach to cancer). 
7 See generally Reinhard Buettner et al., Lessons Learned from Lung Cancer Genomics: The Emerg-
ing Concept of Individualized Diagnostics and Treatment, 31 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1858 (2013).  
8 See Sam Hawgood et al., Precision Medicine: Beyond the Inflection Point, 7 SCI. TRANS-
LATIONAL MED. 1, 1 (2015) (explaining how precision medicine relies on “massive data networks 
that access, aggregate, integrate, and analyze information from huge patient cohorts”). 
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proven itself a physical manifestation of the optimizing economy. Its inventory 
is stored not by product type, but instead by the precise size and shape of every 
item the company sells. Each item is given an identifying number and measured, 
and then complex computer algorithms direct where and how those items should 
be stacked based on physical dimensions—with the result that Amazon has at 
least doubled product storage rates over earlier inventory management systems.9 
The nation’s congested highways represent a similar space-optimization 
challenge. Google’s self-driving cars, while still in the earliest stages, portend a 
transportation future that eventually could optimize time and energy.10 Once 
everyone has a self-driving car, slowdowns caused by accidents or by drivers 
trying to cut ahead in exit lines could be dramatically reduced. Optimizing the 
transportation system to reduce congestion could deliver important productivity 
gains as well as make people’s lives markedly happier.11 In addition, when cars 
start to do all the driving, human occupants may be able to focus their attention 
away from the road to other more productive uses of travel time. 
The future also may bring a highly distributed system of energy 
production built on solar panels and, to a smaller extent, micro-generators. 
Already these kinds of distributed energy technologies are being put into ever 
increasing use. With the prices for solar cells dropping dramatically, 
individuals are now not only powering their own homes, but also seeking to 
sell excess energy back to the grid. Full implementation of distributed energy 
production will depend ultimately on advances in energy storage technology; 
however, the prospect of using currently untapped roof space in cities around 
the country to produce energy holds significant optimizing potential.12 
																																								 																				
9 CBS News, Amazon's Jeff Bezos Looks to the Future (Dec. 1, 2013), https://www.cbsnews. 
com/news/amazons-jeff-bezos-looks-to-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/DYC4-2C2M] (quoting 
Amazon vice president Dave Clark that “we have computers and algorithmic work that tells 
people the areas of the building that have the most space to put product in that's coming in 
at that time” and noting that “Amazon has become so efficient with its stacking, it can now 
store twice as many goods in its centers as it did five years ago”); Will Knight, Inside 
Amazon’s Warehouse Human-Robot Symbiosis, MIT TECH. REV. (July 7, 2015), https:// 
www.technologyreview.com/s/538601/inside-amazons-warehouse-human-robot-symbiosis/ 
[https://perma.cc/25GS-6NMY] (noting that “Amazon’s robotic shelves allow more products to 
be packed into a tighter space”). 
10 See Bernard Marr, Key Milestones Of Waymo - Google's Self-Driving Cars, FORBES (Sept. 
21, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/09/21/key-milestones-of-waymo-
googles-self-driving-cars/#1977ba265369 [https://perma.cc/JB6J-XQQH] (discussing Google’s 
self-driving car project, Waymo).  
11 See Ike Brannon & Mike Gorman, How Investment in Transportation Infrastructure Boosts 
Productivity, THE HILL (Sept. 23, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/transportation/ 
254601-how-investment-in-transportation-infrastructure-boosts [https://perma.cc/PF8C-N83C] 
(explaining how congestion can have a significant effect on manufacturing productivity).  
12 For an overview, see generally Tom Baker et al., Distributed Energy: A Disruptive Force, 
BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP 1 (2014). 
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These are but some of the more prominent examples of the emerging 
optimizing economy. They reveal how significant parts of the economy’s 
trajectory will be influenced by optimization, and they illustrate optimization’s 
three main features: customization or individualization; the use of machine 
learning and other sophisticated forms of data analysis; and the reliance on 
distributed resources, such as data or distributed energy. These three character-
istics underlie the great promise the optimizing economy holds for improving 
society—but they also create major challenges for government regulation. 
 
II. CHALLENGES FOR REGULATION 
 
At its core, the optimizing economy is based on contextualizing: doing a 
better job in matching or otherwise finding ways to tap into and exploit smaller, 
more distributed, but previously underused, resources. And yet, therein lies the 
fundamental conundrum for government. Governments do not do so well with 
contextualizing. Indeed, they are generally not even in that business. 
Lawmaking, for example, is the business of establishing rules, which are, by 
definition, generalizations, not context-specific judgments.13 And in the 
enforcement and implementation of laws, government bureaucracies aim to treat 
people equally—by treating everyone the same.14 Even if government does not 
always achieve this equal-treatment aspiration in practice, the orientation toward 
standardization still persists throughout government and resists movement 
toward customization. The upshot is a growing mismatch between the private 
and public sectors, a gulf not just between private interests and the public 
interest, but a chasm in methods and capacities. Entrepreneurs increasingly aim 
at greater precision, while government regulators continue to operate through 
broad generalizations and standard operating procedures. 
The growing gulf in optimization propensity and skill between the 
private and public sectors should concern anyone, no matter one’s political 
philosophy. It may seem that calling attention to the optimization mismatch fits 
most naturally with a critique of regulation as a burdensome barrier to innovation. 
After all, when state and local government officials invoke existing regulations 
to resist disruptive innovations—such as when localities have enacted laws that 
protect incumbent taxicab businesses by placing restrictions on Uber and 
Lyft’s networking dispatch services15—that resistance fits into a narrative of 
																																								 																				
13 See Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, Regulation by Generalization, 1 REG. & 
GOV. 68, 69 (2007) (explaining how rules inherently depend on generalizations).  
14 Max Weber considered adherence to general rules a defining characteristic of bureaucracy. 
MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 214-216 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, trans. 1946).  
15 See Harriet Taylor, Uber and Lyft are Getting Pushback from Municipalities All Over the 
US, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/uber-and-lyft-are-getting-push 
back-from-municipalities-all-over-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/D2K8-UGSU] (discussing law-
makers’ efforts to thwart Uber and Lyft’s expansion plans). 
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regulatory stagnancy. But those who reject the critique of regulation as an 
unjustified drag on business and who, instead, worry that regulation is 
insufficiently protective of the public, ought also to be concerned about the 
optimization mismatch. New businesses and business practices, after all, bring 
with them new and different risks. If nothing else, the very newness of products 
and processes in the optimizing economy creates uncertainty about their impact 
on others and uncertainty over their quality. Think of how cybersecurity as a 
major policy problem simply did not exist twenty years ago. 
But there is more than just the newness of optimizing innovations. 
Innovation by optimization actually may make hazards to the public harder 
to detect and prevent. Precision drugs, for example, have to be manufactured 
to more exacting standards if they are to be effective—which itself makes 
government’s job in overseeing product quality that much harder. Moreover, 
the conventional standards by which government tests new drugs for safety 
and efficacy may prove ill-equipped for an era of precision medicine, as more 
targeted formulas and treatment protocols necessarily reduce the sample sizes 
upon which drug testing’s statistical analysis depends.16 
The optimizing economy’s penchant for distributing, as well as 
customizing, also may mean there could be many new sites of distinct harm 
that government will need to monitor. With the advent of 3D printing, for 
example, any individual with the necessary technology and know-how could 
begin to manufacture any number of products—even, potentially, new forms 
of biological substances or various kinds of dangerous materials.17 The need 
for smarter, more sophisticated monitoring capacity by government seems 
only likely to increase.   
And yet, government also needs to tread carefully when confronting 
optimizing innovations, because even if they hold risks, they also hold the 
potential for making significant improvements in society. In the face of 
prospects for significantly improved health outcomes from precision med-
																																								 																				
16 For a recent survey of regulatory challenges presented by precision medicine, see Lin-Chau 
Chang & Thomas E. Colonnab, Recent Updates and Challenges on the Regulation of Precision 
Medicine: The United States in Perspective, 96 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 41 (2018). 
17 See, e.g., Robert J. Morrison et al., Regulatory Considerations in the Design and Manufact-
uring of Implantable 3D-Printed Medical Devices, 8 CLIN. & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 594, 595 
(2015) (describing a 3D-printed bioresorbable implantable device used to treat life-threatening 
disease); European Commission, The Disruptive Nature of 3D Printing 3 (Jan. 2017), https://ec. 
europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/dem/monitor/sites/default/files/DTM_The%20disruptive%20 
nature%20of%203D%20printing%20v1.pdf (“[S]ome 3D biomedical systems are already 
capable of printing cells, proteins and organs.”); Richard Matthews, Proposed New Regulations 
for 3D Printed Medical Devices Must Go Further, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 8, 2018), 
http://theconversation.com/proposed-new-regulations-for-3d-printed-medical-devices-must-
go-further-90314 [https://perma.cc/V9VQ-U2CC] (“As the costs of 3D printing have reduced, 
patients are now able to manufacture their own prosthetics at home . . . .”).   
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icine, for instance, drug regulators charged with ensuring safety and efficacy 
of new products also must not impede the development of better medicines. 
What society needs is an ever more optimizing government to come closer to 
matching an ever more optimizing economy.  
At some fundamental level, of course, regulatory officials always 
have had to confront a tradeoff between squelching technological 
innovation and overlooking new risks.18 Indeed, balancing the benefits of 
government regulations with their costs is itself an optimization problem—
although it has been one for which the federal government has only in the 
last few decades created robust institutional processes to try to solve.19  Yet,  
no  matter  how  well  or  poorly the  federal  government has reconciled 
regulatory benefits and costs in the past, in the years to come it will only 
become harder to regulate well. As the regulation of precision medicine 
illustrates, identifying and delivering regulatory benefits will become more 
complicated in the face of growing complexity and the contextualized 
nature of many business enterprises. Regulatory problems are likely to be 
subtler and much harder to detect overall. They likely will be more dynamic 
too, emerging from systems of economic transactions that are moving 
quickly—sometimes across borders.20 
Regulators in the optimizing economy will also face challenges in 
controlling regulatory costs, potentially finding it more important than ever 
to minimize cumulative and overlapping regulatory burdens. According to 
the Office of the Federal Register, the size of the federal rulebook has grown 
nearly 2000 percent since 1950.21 Although it is not clear whether this 
growth is itself a problem—compared to what should 2000 percent be 
																																								 																				
18 Tradeoffs are endemic to regulatory and other public policy decision-making. See 
generally RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John 
D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 1997); GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC 
CHOICES (1978).   
19 And, even then, the standards under which the institutional process of creating and 
reviewing benefit–cost analysis of major new regulations have shifted to some degree. In 
1981, President Reagan formalized White House review of major regulations, directing in 
Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981), that the benefits of regulation should 
generally “outweigh” their costs—a formal expression of optimization. In 1993, however, 
President Clinton replaced the Reagan executive order with one of his own (Exec. Order No. 
12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993)) that has been retained by subsequent presidents 
and that requires, instead of full optimization, that regulations’ benefits “justify” their costs. 
20 See, e.g., IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 5 (Cary 
Coglianese et al. eds., 2010) (“The sheer volume of international trade creates a vast and 
complex network of the sources of safety problems”). 
21 OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (TOTAL VOLUMES AND 
PAGES 1950–2014), https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2015/05/Code-of-Federal-Reg 
ulations-Total-Pages-and-Volumes-1938-2014.pdf.  
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judged?—such growth does at least suggest the potential for increased 
cumulative regulatory costs. Michael Mandel and Diana Carew have  
argued that accumulating regulations bring more than just increased costs 
to businesses; they also may increase the possibility of undesirable 
interactions between regulations or potentially decrease the amount of 
upper-level management attention devoted to further business optimization 
and growth.22  
In some existing areas of regulation, such as food safety and financial  
services, concern persists that regulations already overlap with each other  
or are administered by different government agencies in an uncoordinated  
fashion.23 Such concerns seem only likely to grow in an optimizing economy. 
Uber, after all, faces disputes today over whether its drivers fall into the 
category of employees, who are subject to labor law protections, or the 
category of contractors, who are not.24 Other firms offering optimizing 
innovations may find that they fit poorly into existing regulatory categories 
or even cut across several categories. Moreover, as firms increasingly build 
optimizing business strategies, the relative importance of overlapping 
regulatory authorities to their success may only increase. Overlapping 
jurisdictions and the accretion of regulation layered upon regulation may 
have been more easily accommodated in a “satisficing” era than in an 
optimizing one.25 
 
III. OPTIMIZING REGULATION 
 
The growing mismatch between complex contextualization in the 
economy and an accumulated set of rule generalizations in the government 
may be one of most significant challenges for governance of the U.S. economy 
in the decades to come. What might be done to bring the U.S. federal gov-
ernment and its regulatory system into greater alignment with emerging 
innovations in the economy, so as to regulate more smartly an economy that is 
itself only growing smarter? 
																																								 																				
22 Michael Mandel & Diana G. Carew, Regulatory Improvement Commission: A Politically-
Viable Approach to U.S. Regulatory Reform, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST. 1, 3 (2013). 
23 See Cary Coglianese, There’s an Easy Way to Untangle Regulatory Knots, L.A. TIMES 
(March 31, 2015, 6:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0401-coglianese-
regulations-20150401-story.html [https://perma.cc/UWP3-4CTC] (recommending a strategy 
for government to reduce regulatory overlap). 
24 See Katy Steinmetz, Why the California Ruling on Uber Should Frighten the Sharing 
Economy, TIME (June 17, 2015), http://time.com/3924941/uber-california-labor-comm 
ission-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/78UQ-E2NM] (discussing a 2015 ruling from the California 
Labor Commission in favor of an Uber driver seeking classification as an employee). 
25 Herbert Simon coined the term “satisfice.” Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the 
Structure of the Environment, 63. PSYCH. REV. 129, 129 (1956). 
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First and foremost, an optimizing regulatory system will need an 
analytically sophisticated workforce.26 Since at least the 1980s, though, it has 
been clear that the federal government confronts a shortfall in talented 
managers and leaders. As Paul Volcker’s National Commission on Public 
Service noted then, “too many of the best of the nation’s senior executives 
are ready to leave government, and not enough of its most talented young 
people are willing to join.”27 Today, the federal government is facing the 
prospect of more than a third of the existing federal workforce reaching 
retirement age by 2020—a significant and sudden decline in needed human 
capital.28 But as critical and monumental of a challenge as it is simply to 
maintain a federal workforce with mission-critical skills, the need today is no 
longer just to stem the tide of out-flow from the ranks of governmental 
service.29 Government needs a new type of talent in-flow as well, one that 
brings even greater analytic capacities to the oversight of the optimizing 
economy.30 The federal government needs human analytic capacity capable 
of understanding, tracking, and responding to new risks and new business 
practices in ways that do not impede productive innovations for society. If 
one of the answers to declining American competitiveness is, as Michael 
Porter and colleagues have recently suggested in the context of regulating 
unconventional oil and gas development,31 the greater use of performance-
																																								 																				
26 See Cary Coglianese, Regulatory Excellence as ‘People Excellence,’ REG. REV. (Oct. 23, 2015), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2015/10/23/coglianese-people-excellence/ [https://perma.cc/2KR 
7-RS94] (arguing that regulatory quality depends on the quality of regulatory workforces). 
27 Paul A. Volcker, Preface to the NAT’L COMMISSION ON PUB. SERV., LEADERSHIP FOR 
AMERICA: REBUILDING THE PUBLIC SERVICE (1989). 
28 Federal Workforce: Sustained Attention to Human Capital Leading Practices Can Help 
Improve Agency Performance: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, 115th Cong. 3-4 (2017) (testimony of Robert Goldenkoff, Director of Strategic 
Issues), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684709.pdf.  
29 For broader perspectives on the vital need for maintaining a competent federal workforce, see 
JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., BRING BACK THE BUREAUCRATS (2014); DONALD F. KETTL, ESCAPING 
JURASSIC GOVERNMENT: HOW TO RECOVER AMERICA’S LOST COMMITMENT TO COMPETENCE 
(2016); MICHAEL LEWIS, THE FIFTH RISK (2018); PAUL C. LIGHT, A GOVERNMENT ILL 
EXECUTED: THE DECLINE OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE AND HOW TO REVERSE IT (2009).   
30 Among the needed analytic capacities must obviously be an understanding of and facility 
with machine learning and other big data analytic techniques that support optimizing trends 
in the private sector. But an analytically sophisticated workforce must also possess the habits 
of mind and analytic tools needed to keep learning over time. For accessible discussions of 
key modes of learning and inference, see RICHARD E. NISBETT, MINDWARE: TOOLS FOR 
SMART THINKING 149-170 (2015); Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis of Administrative 
Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1115–1119 (2002); Cary Coglianese, Learning What Works 
in Regulation, REG. REVIEW (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/03/07/ 
coglianese-rubin-learning-what-works-regulation/.  
31 MICHAEL E. PORTER, DAVID S. GEE & GREGORY J. POPE, AMERICA’S UNCONVENTIONAL 
ENERGY OPPORTUNITY 1, 2, 7 (2015). 
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based and management-based approaches to regulation, government will 
need to have the distinctive human infrastructure in place to establish and 
implement these approaches in ways that actually work well.32 
Second, the federal government’s information technology infrastructure 
needs to rise to the task. “Amid all the uncertainty about government’s future,” 
notes Donald Kettl, “there is one sure thing.”33 That “sure thing” is that 
government “will operate in a world of increasing technology and data.”34 Yet 
unfortunately, too many federal computer systems are antiquated.35 As recently as 
2016, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that three-
quarters of federal IT spending each year goes to support old “legacy systems,” 
many of which “are becoming increasingly obsolete” due to “outdated software 
languages and hardware parts that are unsupported.”36 Not only do such aging 
systems need to be upgraded, but still more challenging will be finding ways to 
combine databases across the federal government in order to use machine learning 
and “big data” analysis to make government smarter. New analytic tools can give 
regulatory agencies an ability to optimize their human resources better too. For 
example, an analysis conducted at the Penn Program on Regulation has shown that 
the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration could improve its 
targeting of limited regulatory inspection resources dramatically by combining 
and applying machine learning to disparate governmental and private-sector 
datasets. In an economy increasingly propelled by machine learning and other 
optimizing analytics in the private sector, it makes sense that regulatory officials 
need to rely on these techniques too.37 Some agencies, like the U.S. Environmental 
																																								 																				
32 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCI’S., ENGINEERING, & MED., DESIGNING SAFETY REGULA-
TIONS FOR HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES 100 (2018) (“A regulator that lacks or cannot develop a 
required capacity, such as a staff with sophisticated risk analysis and auditing competencies, 
may find that the attributes of a regulation type that make it attractive can create a considerable 
burden and practical obstacle to regulatory effectiveness.”). See generally Cary Coglianese, 
Management-Based Regulation: Implications for Public Policy, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., RISK AND REGULATORY POLICY: IMPROVING THE GOVERNANCE 
OF RISK (Gregory Bounds & Nikolai Malyshev eds., 2010); Cary Coglianese et al., 
Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environ-
mental Regulation, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705 (2003).  
33 KETTL, supra note 29, at 146.  
34 Id. 
35 See Jack Moore, The Crisis in Federal IT that’s Scarier than Y2K Ever Was, NEXTGOV (Nov. 
20, 2015), http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2015/11/crisis-federal-it-rivals-y2k/123908/ 
[https://perma.cc/3DRH-R4YV] (explaining that archaic IT systems are vulnerable to failure, 
difficult to protect from cybersecurity threats, and expensive to maintain). 
36 Federal Agencies Need to Address Aging Legacy Systems: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony of David A. Powner, Director, 
Information Technology Management Issues), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677454.pdf. 
37 Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision-Making in 
the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L. J. 1147, 1160 (2017) (“For much the same reason 
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Protection Agency, are starting to consider how new remote sensing and other 
technology can be deployed for improved regulatory monitoring.38 But the 
government has many miles still to travel in order to use digital technology and 
artificial intelligence to catch up with the private sector.39 
Finally, an optimizing government should learn from the past in order to 
chart a better path forward. Society has faced innovations and their associated 
risks before. Yet too often in the past, new technologies have been given a 
regulatory “free pass,” emerging with little government oversight but leaving 
public harms in their wake—as with much industrial development in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Or, at the other extreme, new 
innovations have sometimes been blocked altogether. Both approaches are 
decidedly non-optimizing—even clunky—in the context of today’s economy.40 
And yet, remnants of these approaches still persist in public policy responses to 
recent innovations in the economy. Perhaps one of the more salient examples 
comes from the energy sector, where technological advances have enabled firms 
to find natural gas in literally fine-grained ways by using hydraulic fracturing—
or fracking—to extract previously trapped energy resources. On the one hand, 
the federal government has exempted unconventional natural gas development 
entirely from certain environmental regulations under the so-called Halliburton 
amendment.41 On the other hand, several states, including New York, have gone 
to the other extreme and have imposed complete bans on this method of energy 
extraction.42 For many innovations in the optimizing economy, the government 
can afford neither to give a complete regulatory free pass in the face of new risks, 
nor to ban outright otherwise valuable new business models and practices. For 
example, in the face of a variety of concerns about the harmful effects of social 
media platforms, whether in violating personal privacy, propagating falsehoods, 
																																								 																				
that machine learning has been exploited in the private sector, its use holds potentially great 
value to government agencies.”).  
38 Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, 30 ENVTL. F., 22, 24 (2013), https://www.epa.gov 
/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/giles-next-gen-article-forum-eli-sept-oct-2013.pdf. 
39 The challenge, of course, is only partly technological. As Don Kettl notes, government 
needs to acquire both “powerful new data tools and better managers to use them.” KETTL, 
supra note 29, at xi; see also WILLIAM D. EGGERS, DELIVERING ON DIGITAL: THE INNOVATORS 
AND TECHNOLOGIES THAT ARE TRANSFORMING GOVERNMENT 239 (2016) (observing that 
“[d]igitally mature governments also build digitally savvy workforces”). That is why attracting 
and nurturing an analytically sophisticated workforce is the first and foremost priority.  
40 ALVIN W. ROTH, WHO GETS WHAT—AND WHY: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF MATCHMAKING 
AND MARKET DESIGN 227 (2015) (noting that decision-makers “can sometimes err by 
regulating too slowly and not vigorously enough, but also by regulating too hastily”). 
41 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(2).  
42 See, e.g., Jon Hurdle, With Governor’s Signature, Maryland Becomes Third State to Ban 
Fracking, STATE IMPACT PA. (Apr. 4, 2017), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2017/04 
/04/with-governors-signature-maryland-becomes-third-state-to-ban-fracking/ [https://perma.cc/ 
SYV5-9Z7U]. 
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or facilitating foreign interference in elections, the appropriate response is surely 
not doing nothing—nor is it to outlaw such platforms altogether.43 Gov-
ernment’s appropriate response to the risks presented by most innovations will 
presumably lie somewhere between inaction and overbroad regulation. But 
making the optimal choice between these two extremes will depend in the first 
instance on the collection and analysis of sound information by regulators. It will 
also require responsible, ongoing regulatory vigilance.44 Smart regulation can 
only optimize by regulating just enough and in the right ways when regulators 
are themselves smart and attentive to the need to find the proper balance.45 
 
CONCLUSION 
	
What stands in the way of more optimal regulation? Significant resource 
constraints, bureaucratic and political entrenchment, and a status quo bias—all 
of these are and likely will remain major impediments for some time to come. 
But the barriers need to be confronted and overcome. Regulatory challenges in 
an optimizing economy certainly will be no easier than ones in the past; however, 
they will prove decidedly insurmountable if nothing is done to counteract the 
growing mismatch between governmental capacity and private-sector inno-
vation. Policy action must become smarter than ever before. 
The path forward to expanded economic growth will involve new, creative 
forms of optimization. Indeed, an American economy based on natural resources 
and labor abundance may already be on the decline, and, if so, the economy of the 
future will, by necessity, be built on optimizing what is left. With significant 
portions of the economy already based on an imperative to optimize, and with 
businesses rapidly advancing in precision and analytic sophistication, government 
will only be able to fulfill its responsibilities by becoming more optimizing itself. 
																																								 																				
43 For discussion of concerns raised by social media, see, e.g., Ryan Broderick, This Is How 
We Radicalized The World, BUZZFEED (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article 
/ryanhatesthis/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-facebook-elections [https://perma.cc/7VR2-QF9P]; Peter 
Bruce, The Facebook Controversy: Privacy Is Not the Issue, SCI. AMER. (April 18, 2018), https:// 
blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-facebook-controversy-privacy-is-not-the-issue/ 
[https://perma.cc/M34N-DTVQ]; Joanna Stern, Facebook Really Is Spying on You, Just Not 
Through Your Phone’s Mic, WALL ST. J. (March 7, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/face 
book-really-is-spying-on-you-just-not-through-your-phones-mic-1520448644. For discussion 
of potential regulatory responses in an era of big data, see JAMIE SUSSKIND, FUTURE 
POLITICS: LIVING TOGETHER IN A WORLD TRANSFORMED BY TECH 354-359 (2018); Dirk 
Helbing et al., Will Democracy Survive Big Data and Artificial Intelligence?, SCI. AMER. 
(Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-democracy-survive-big-
data-and-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/C39V-XGCY].  
44 Cary Coglianese, Innovation and Regulatory Vigilance, JOTWELL (October 19, 2018), 
https://adlaw.jotwell.com/innovation-and-regulatory-vigilance/ (reviewing CRISTIE FORD, 
INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE (2017)). 
45 For a wide-ranging discussion of the attributes of smart regulation—and how to achieve 
it—see ACHIEVING REGULATORY EXCELLENCE (Cary Coglianese ed., 2017). 
